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This nation is run, essentially, by income tax collections, and
the Internal Revenue Service painstakingly enforces criminal
sanctions on would-be evaders. Tax evasion strikes more directly
at the sovereignty, and less directly at individual citizens, than
other white-collar crimes. The raison d’ etre for vigorous crimi-
nal tax enforcement is to deter tax evasion and to assure the
taxpaying public that each individual taxpayer is held account-
able for his fair share of the tax burden.
Trained investigators, known as special agents, play a key role
in the enforcement program. Through their legwork and ingenu-
ity, proof of tax liabilities is often pieced together from scattered
third-party records and recollections. Criminal prosecution rec-
ommendations initiated by special agents at the completion of
their investgations are screened at numerous levels before crimi-
nal charges are instituted. The results, in an average year, are
over 90 per cent convictions in the roughly 1,000 prosecutions,
with four out of five paying fines and one out of three going to
jail. Criminal prosecution of tax evaders contributes in no small
measure to the success of our self-assessment tax structure.
W HY AND HOW TAX COLLECTORS are·· in the criminal enforcement
business is a subject that sometimes
needs explanation, especially as it
refers to the major source of federal
revenues-the income tax.
Income Taxes Run Nation
There are-though some may tend
to forget them-dozens of other feder-
al taxes. For some-wagering,
firearms, narcotics, alcohol and to-
bacco-the need for criminal sanc-
tions is obvious on the face of things.
However, many may well wonder
why criminal sanctions have any
place at all with regard to the income
tax, which reaches into every Ameri-
can home.
Let us first take a quick statistical
look at fiscal year 1966. Of the $128.8
billion total federal collections, over
$92 billion came from income taxes.
It is the American income taxpayer
who finances his country-it is as sim.
ple as that.
1,000 Prosecutions
If recent experience holds up,
about one thousand of the almost
seventy million Forms 1040 or 1040A
which were or should have been filed
during fiscal 1966 will eventually pro-
duce criminal prosecutions for what
can be labled as-at the risk of over-
simplification-tax evasion. The thou-
sand or so criminal tax defendants
will come. from all walks of life and
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run the entire spectrum of income tax
brackets. This will include profession-
als, businessmen, executives, farmers,
and wage-earners. All but a few will
have never before been in trouble
with the law. To bring about their
criminal prosecution, the Internal
Revenue Service alone will expend
over fifteen hundred man-years of
effort by its specialized criminal inves-
tigators, plus over fifty attorney man-
years-all this before the defendants
enter the criminal courtroom.
How does all this hustle and bustle
to enforce the criminal tax sanctions
square with the common concepts of
criminology?
Tax Evasion-A Unique Crime
In terms of the nature of the crime,
income tax evasion~ither by filing a
false return or filing no return-is a
very rare bird indeed. The tax evader
leaves no identifiable victim bloodied
or robbed in his wake. Persons who
might not dream for a moment of
hurting their fellow man may be
tempted by the opportunity to under-
report their tax liability when they
take pen in hand on April 15 to fill
out their Form 1040.
This does not refer to those parasit-
ic tax crimes where someone is trying
to make a living off the tax structure
-such as the employer who fails to
pay withheld trust fund taxes, the fly-
by-night who files multiple fraudulent
refund returns in the hope that re-
cords of the district directors will not
be cross-checked, the tax practitioner
who pockets his client’s money ear-
marked for payment of taxes, and the
bribe giver or taker in an attempted
tax fix.
It refers instead to the taxpayer
who is doing what comes naturally by
trying to hold on to as much of his
money as he can and further-quite a
lot further, I hasten to add-is willing
to cross the line the law allows in
order to do it. No other criminal
sanction closely parallels tax evasion.
It becomes even more difficut to fit 
criminal tax sanctions on the frame-
work of theoretical criminology when
attention is turned from the nature of
the crime to the purpose of imposing
punishment. The three R&dquo;s of penolo-
gy are utterly inoperative. Revenge
by the injured sovereign? This re-
tributive aspect-the discredited eye-
for-an-eye notion-is handled sepa-
rately by collecting the tax dollars
which should have been paid in the
first place. The second R-removal of
danger from society? Paradoxically,
the evader is often a functioning cog
in the local economy, so that putting
him behind bars may in fact do dam-
age to society. The third R-
rehabilitation of the criminal as an
individual? Recidivism is negligible
among tax evaders-they usually are
reformed the minute the revenue
agent rings their doorbell.
Still, there is surely a purpose to
punishment of convicted tax evaders.
Four out of five pay fines; one out of
three goes to jail.
The purpose is this: Vigorous crim-
inal tax enforcement serves to deter
the tens of thousands of taxpayers
who might otherwise succumb to the
temptation to try to cheat.
More importantly it serves to assure
the tens of millions of other taxpay-
ers, who willingly accept their taxpay-
ing duties as the price of their civili-
zation, that everyone else is held ac-
countable for his fair share of the tax
burden.
It is largely because of the criminal
enforcement program that voluntary
compliance with the tax laws has be-
come an accepted way of life here. In
countries where criminal tax sanc-
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tions do not exist or are winked at,
the tax laws become nothing much
more than scribblings in the statute
book.
Key Role of Special Agent
The function of the executive
branch in the government scheme of
things is perhaps simpler than that of
the legislative or the judiciai branch.
Congress must estimate the public
will and welfare to determine and to
define precisely what conduct should
be declared criminal. The courts must
make the soul-searching decision of
exactly what punishment should be
meted out to an individual convicted
of tax evasion. Even so-as you may
have surmised from the earlier figure
of one thousand cases worked up ev-
ery year by fifteen hundred investi-
gators and fifty lawyers-the IRS takes
most seriously the function of getting
the right cases into the criminal court-
rooms.
There are many possible sources
for IRS cases-crumpled currency in a
tin box dug up behind a garage, a
report to the local police of a large
jewel theft, a bookkeeper or a girl
friend whose hasty dismissal a tax
evader later repented in the leisure of
a jail cell. Over ten thousand such
information items are sifted by IRS
criminal investigators every month.
But it is the system itself-tax returns
assigned for audit examination be-
cause of a patently questionable item
or an educated sampling classification
that generates most of the IRS crimi-
nal income-tax cases.
Whatever its origin, the tax cases
with substantial, though as yet unde-
veloped, criminal potential will wind
up in the capable hands of a special
agent assigned to the Intelligence Di-
vision of one of the fifty-eight IRS
district offices.
The special agent is the trained
and dedicated professional whose
shoulders carry the weight of the en-
forcement program. It is through his
imaginativeness in detecting fraud,
his leg work, his diligence in gather-
ing the evidence from documentary
records and third parties, and, most
important of all, his sound and impar-
tial judgment in making the initial
recommendation to pursue the matter
that the processing of a criminal tax
prosecution is begun.
Processing the Case
The investigative phase of a crimi-
nal tax case may take several months
or years. A special agent is in charge
of the conduct of the investigation
and method of procedure. He is usu-
ally assisted by a revenue agent, who
attends to the audit, accounting, and
tax features. Such teams of agents
conducting joint investigations can,
when the situation demands it, piece
records of a taxpayer’s transactions
into almost a daily diary of his where-
abouts and activities. For ingenuity
and sheer tenacity IRS holds its tax
gumshoes second to none.
The object of the investigation is to
see whether the case satisfies Internal
Revenue Service’s standard of pros-
ecution. The standard is two-fold.
First, there must be available suffi-
cient evidence to establish guilt be-
yond a reasonable doubt. Second,
there must be a reasonable probabil-
ity of securing a conviction. Over the
years these dual tests have established
a very finite framework for measuring
the appropriateness of instituting
prosecution.
Where, after his full-scale investiga-
tion, a special agent finds his case
falling short of the standard of prose-
cution, he discusses it with his superi-
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ors. The decision to close such a case
without prosecution is made by the
chief of the Intelligence Division at
the district level. That, for all practi-
cal purposes, is the probable end of
the criminal aspects of the matter.
If, on the other hand, the special
agent tentatively finds that his case
satisfied the Revenue Service’s stand-
ard of prosecution, the taxpayer is
customarily afforded the opportuni-
ty of a formal conference at the dis-
trict level. The purpose of the confer-
ence is to let the taxpayer offer what-
ever explanation he has. While the
taxpayer is generally apprised of the
alleged fraudulent features of the
case, the IRS representative must
sometimes speak guardedly so as not
to invite fabricated defenses or
endanger prospective witnesses.
With this limitation in mind, the IRS
representative does what he can to
exchange relevant facts and ideas
about the case.
On the heels of the formal confer-
ence, the special agent reaches his
decision on whether to recommend
prosecution. As indicated, where the
decision is against prosecution the
case can be closed with the concur-
rence of the district chief. However, if
the special agent recommends prose-
cution, his final report, together with
the exhibits in the case and memoran-
da of conferences, travel to one of the
seven IRS regional offices.
Before it ever gets to trial, the
recommended criminal income-tax
case undergoes stringent and indepen-
dent reviews by the assistant regional
commissioner for Intelligence, the as-
sistant regional counsel for Enforce-
ment, the Criminal Section of the
Tax Division of the Department of
Justice, and the United States attor-
ney. In essence, each of these succes-
sive levels of review generally gives
the taxpayer another shot at stopping
the case and the special agent another
shot at moving it. The whole mechan-
ism is intended to insure that the
right cases-only those that are right,
but all of those that are right-are
criminally prosecuted.
That is not to say for a certainty
that a conviction will be obtained in
every one of the thousand or so crimi-
nal income-tax cases prosecuted annu-
ally. Through the years, though, this
procedure has produced the rather
remarkable record of convicting
about 93 per cent of those prosecuted,
a result that helps to keep the taxpay-
ing public honest and content-and
confident in the effective, even-
handed administration of the internal
revenue laws.
